each other. Lop ez is concerned not only w ith the content of the stories and how they connect u s to the m ore-than-hu m an w orld , bu t also w ith how the stories are received . H e is concerned w ith the rhetorical stance the listener--or in ou r case the read er--brings to the exp erience. Lop ez w ants to find a w ay to exp and notions of know led ge to inclu d e not only the em p irical and qu antifiable, bu t also the p ersonal.
To this end , he asks u s to su sp end initial d ou bt for initial belief. To u se Wayne Booth's term , he calls for a rhetoric of assent.
I
Lop ez sets u p his d iscu ssion of assent by relating a story he heard from the N u nam iu t w ho live near the Brooks Range in Alaska. H e heard the story d u ring an inform al exchange of hu nting and trap p ing tales. Lop ez w rites:
The story I rem em ber m ost vivid ly w as abou t a m an hu nting a w olverine from a snow m achine in the sp ring. H e follow ed the anim al's tracks for several m iles over roll ing tu nd ra in a certain valley. Soon he cau ght sight ahead of a d ark sp ot on the crest of a hill --the w olverine p au sing to look back. The hu nter w as catching u p bu t each tim e he cam e over a rise the w olverine w as looking back from the next rise, ju st ou t of range. The hu nter top p ed one m ore rise and m et the w olverine bou nd ing tow ard him . Before he cou ld p u ll his rifle from its scabbard , the w olverine flew across the engine cow l and the w ind shield , hitting him squ are in the chest. The hu nter scram bled h is arm s w ild ly, trying to get the w olverine ou t of his lap , and fell over as he d id so. The w olverine ju m p ed clear as the snow m achine rolled over, and fixed the m an w ith a stare. H e had not bitten, not even scratched the m an. Then the w olverine w alked aw ay. The m an thou ght of reaching for the gu n, bu t no, he d id not. Lop ez then send s a cop y of this story to a friend in Canad a w ho w orks am ong the Cree p eop le.
asking him to relate the story to his hosts. Up on seeing his friend , Lop ez asks him a bou t the reaction of the Cree. Their resp onse illu strates w hat is key to Lop ez's theory of u nd erstand ing the natu ral w orld .
"You know how they are." he tells Lop ez. "They said , 'That cou ld hap p en'" (70).
To grasp the im p ortance of these three w ord s, w e m u st first know that the Cree are exp erts on w olverine; their resp onse is not d ivorced from exp erience. They cou ld have assu m ed a m ore skep tical stance, d ou bting u ntil they had p roof of this som ew hat sensational and anthrop om orp hic accou nt.
H ow ever, the story fits w ithin the realm of their exp erience and , consequ ently, they assent to the p ossibility. They give an initial "yes" to the story of the w olverine. Lop ez argu es that the d egree of tru th w e are able to d iscern d ep end s u p on ou r w illingness to assu m e the rhetorical stance of the Cree. H e insists w e w ill find the m ost tru th "only w hen w e accord one another the resp ect the Cree show ed the N u nam iu t." Withou t su ch a gestu re of resp ect, he asserts, "there are only failu res of im agination: red u ctionism in science; fu nd am entalism in religion; fascism in p olitics" (71).
The typ e of resp ect the Cree show the N u nam iu t is the fou nd ation u p on w hich Lop ez bu ild s a theory of u nd erstand ing stories abou t the natu ral w orld . Lop ez's com m ents on the w olverine sto ry can easily be exp and ed into theory of read ing natu re w riting. When w e ap p roach natu re w riting, w e face a situ ation sim ilar to that of the Cree. We are asked to ju d ge the p ossibility of w hat w e are read ing.
Furtherm ore, the stories that w e read abou t the m ore-than-hu m an w orld have ethical im p lications. If w e assent to a story that gets it w rong, w e are less likely to find ethical relationship s --w e too are likely to get it w rong. Yet if w e assent to a story that gets it right, ou r ability to form ethi cal relationship s to the w orld is enhanced . In fact, becau se natu re w riting often asks u s to aband on conventional relationship s w ith the natu ral w orld for m ore ethical ones, ou r op enness to new p ossibilities, ou r assent, can have great rew ard .
Moreover, Lop ez im p lies--throu gh exam p le of the Cree's resp onse--an initial yes w hen p resented w ith new id eas, stories, or argu m ents, is w hat allow s the p ossibility for a m ore ethical resp onse. The other op tion--an initial no--as Lop ez notes, lead s d ow n the p ath of red u ctionism , fu nd am entalism , and fascism .
To see w hy w e m u st initially assent, w e need to look at the w ork of Wayne Booth. In M odern Dogma and the Rhetoric of A ssent, like Lop ez, Booth claim s that a rhetoric of d ou bt lead s d ow n the sam e red u ctionist, fu nd am entalist, and fascist p ath. Booth m akes the argu m ent for assent at greater length than Lop ez, and in d oing so insists that, becau se contem p orary thinking has fallen into an extrem e skep ticism w hich he calls modern dogma, assent is need ed . For an exam p le, Booth p oints to the p hilosop hy of Bertrand Ru ssell, w hich he feels clearly d em onstrates the excesses of m od ern d ou bt. For Booth, the conflict lies w ithin Ru ssell's qu est for certain know led ge and in his d enial of any fact or id ea that cannot w ithstand the rigor of em p irical testing. Su ch a narrow test w ou ld elim inate m any w ays of know ing the w orld . It w ou ld esp ecially elim inate the p ersonal as a legitim ate w ay of u nd erstand ing.
Booth w rites:
Thou gh [Ru ssell] often said that nothing is certain, h e never gave u p the notion that w hat one shou ld look for, w hen looking for tru th, is the m ost nearly certain p rop ositions one can find and certainty w as alw ays a fu nction of em p irical and logical p roving. Su ch a search m eans in p ractice that m ost of w hat w e consid er im p ortant w ill be u nknow able becau se u np rovable, and it also m eans that belief in the u niversal efficacy of d ou bt becom es the m ost certain belief of all. (58) What is at stake here, if w e em brace an extrem e skep ticism su ch as Ru ssell's, is th e aband onm ent of all know led ge that cannot be verified em p irically --the aband onm ent of m ost valu es and of reasoning abou t those valu es. Fu rtherm ore, if w e ad op t this extrem e form of skep ticism , w e also em brace an initial "no" instead of an initial "yes." And , as Booth notes, "The notion that w e have reason to believe only w hat has been p roved in the sense of w ithstand ing all p ossible d ou bts, cannot be lived w ith by m ost of u s for even a m om ent" (66). In Seeking A wareness in A merican N ature W riting, Scott Slovic asserts that Lop ez's theory of u nd erstand ing the w orld w ou ld reject the narrow ness of extrem e d ou bt. Accord ing to Slovic, Lop ez asks u s to change ou r habitu al w ay of thinking: "The sp ecific change [Lop ez] calls for is the renew ed reliance on p ersonal exp erience, in ad d ition to the less su bjective and m ore qu antitative ap p roaches w hich Western civilization, at least since Francis Bacon, has com e to esteem m ost highly" (141). Lop ez asks u s to valu e the em p irical along w ith the p ersonal. Being carefu l and w atchfu l--being a good em p iricist--is som ething he find s necessary for know ing the w orld . Bu t Lop ez also recognizes the lim its of this ep istem ology and realizes that it is only w hen close observation is joined w ith other less qu antifiable ep istem ological m ethod s--the p ersonal, the m ythic, the im aginative--that w e tru ly begin to u nd erstand w hat is "ou t there" and w hat ou r relationship to it is, or m ore im p ortantly, w hat it shou ld be. Moreover, if w e are going to extend ou r m ethod s of know ing to inclu d e the p ersonal w ith the qu antitative, w e m u st also ap p roach new id eas and new stories w ith an initial "yes."
Assent is esp ecially necessary w hen ap p roaching the p roblem of environm ental ethics. The id ea of exp and ing ou r ethical system beyond the bou nd s of hu m anity is cou nter to Western trad ition. We have sp ent m illennia in the West w ith the natu ral w orld as ou r foe --as som ething to be conqu ered , as som ething to be overcom e--rather than as som ething w ith w hich to seek harm ony. If w e are to overcom e su ch a long trad ition of d om ination, w e m u st be w illing to "try on" the relationship s that natu re w riters are creating w ith the natu ral w orld and evalu ate the "tru th" they p rovid e abou t living in the w orld . The resp ect and op enness of the "that cou ld hap p en" stance is vital if w e are to exp lore new w ays to live. Assent, how ever, d oes not elim inate the need for u sefu l d ou bt. The op enness of the Cree's resp onse is not naive accep tance. We are often confronted w ith blatantly false stories. In the sp ecific case of nonfiction natu re w riting, I w ou ld argu e there is a certain contract established betw een the read er and the w riter--a contract that requ ires clear fid elity to the w orld . If w e are asked by w riters to accep t their ethical vision, w e m u st be able to tru st their d ep iction of reality. Blatantly fa lse stories w ill affect ou r relationship w ith the m ore-than-hu m an w orld in p otentially negative w ays. We m u st, then, d ecid e w hen to assent and w hen to have reason to d ou bt. Both Booth and Lop ez p rovid e u sefu l criteria for su ch d iscrim ination.
Booth's m ajor criterion for assent is life exp erience. We all com e to stories and argu m ents w ith the exp erience of other stories and argu m ents that have alread y been p roven to be satisfactorily tru e or false. Accord ingly, Booth w rites: "When I m eet, as I d id last year, a you ng Forest Service em p loyee w ho believes that m en on earth can p roject them selves instantaneou sly to Venu s and back again, I d o not grant assent p end ing d isp roof; I have no im p u lse to assent at all, since the claim ru ns cou nter to all of m y exp erience" (107). Booth u ses an extrem e exam p le to m ake his p oint; yet, w e are u su ally p resented w ith m u ch m ore su btle situ ations. Bu t w e all have life exp erience to rely u p on. The assent that Booth is w riting abou t here--gau ged by life exp erience--is very sim ilar to the assent Lop ez asks u s to ad op t. Lop ez d id n't have enou gh exp erience w ith either the w olverine or the story telling context, so he relied on the Cree. Referring to the Cree and their "that cou ld hap p en" resp onse, Lop ez w rites: "In thes e u ncom p licated w ord s the Cree d eclared their ow n know led ge of the w olverine"(70). The Cree cam e to the w olverine story w ith sp ecific life exp erience, and even thou gh they had never seen a w olverine to this exact thing, their life exp erience told them it w as very p ossible; therefore, they assented . [1] Life exp erience is also im p ortant for Lop ez, and he u ses exp erience to help d eterm ine the d ifference betw een w hat he calls authentic and inauthentic stories. Althou gh, in the instance of the w olverine he is sp eaking abou t a very sp ecific typ e of story telling, Lop ez's u se of the term story is m ore general inclu d ing nonfiction p rose, novel, short story, and p oetry as w ell as trad itional narrative form s su ch as m yth (68). The tou chstone for his au thentic/ ina u thentic d istinction rests w ith tw o "land scap es" --the interior and the exterior. The exterior land scap e is "the one w e see --not only the line and color of the land and its shad ing at d ifferent tim es of the d ay, bu t also its p lants and anim als in season, i ts w eather, its geology, the record of its clim ate and evolu tion." H e then notes: "One learns land scap e finally not by know ing the nam e or id entity of everything in it, bu t by p erceiving the relationship s in it --like that betw een the sp arrow and the tw ig" (64).
The interior land scap e is "a kind of p rojection w ithin a p erson of a p art of the exterior land scap e." So, accord ing to Lop ez, the interior land scap e m u st correlate in som e w ay to w hat's "ou t there." This interior/ exterior relationship is im p ort ant. "Relationship s in the exterior land scap e," w rites Lop ez, "inclu d e those that are nam ed and d iscernible, su ch as the nitrogen cycle, or a vertical sequ ence of Ord ovician lim estone, and others that are u ncod ified or ineffable, su ch as w inter light fall ing on a p articu lar kind of granite, or the effect of hu m id ity on the frequ ency of a blackp oll w arbler's bu rst of song." In other w ord s, the "interior land scap e resp ond s to the character and su btlety of the exterior land scap e; the shap e of the ind ivid u al m ind is affected by the land as it is by genes" (65). The relationship betw een the interior and exterior land scap e is one of recip rocity betw een the w orld and the ind ivid u al existing in the w orld .
The id ea of interior and exterior land scap e is im p ortant becau se Lop ez's id eas of "au thentic" and "inau thentic" are rooted in how these tw o land scap es correlate. Althou gh in this exam p le Lop ez w rites abou t a w ild exterior land scap e, the sam e id ea ap p lies to a cityscap e or a ru ral scene. For Lop ez, it is ju st as im p ortant that the relationship s be au thentic in a story abou t a hou sing p roject as one abou t an alp ine cirqu e. As Law rence Bu ell notes abou t Lop ez's w ork: "Su bjectivity is not a m ere fu nction of land scap e; bu t it is regu lated som ew hat by land scap e, and as far as Lop ez is concerned land scap e is the m ore Lop ez's id ea abou t land scap es takes Booth's id ea of life exp erience one step fu rther and ap p lies it to the sp ecific p roblem of ou r relationship w ith the natu ral w orld . Lop ez is insisting that ou r life exp eriences occu r in sp ecific p laces and th at those p laces shap e those exp eriences. This is not to say that land scap e d eterm ines ou r exp erience, bu t that it offers a certain range of p ossibilities. Ou r exp erience w ill d iffer greatly in the Arctic from ou r exp erience in Manhattan. There is a d ist inctly d ifferent set of p ossibilities in Utah's San Rafael Sw ell than there is in Costa Rica's San Blas Island s. Becau se w e are concerned w ith natu re w riting here, su ch a d istinction is vital to ou r d iscu ssion.
The id ea of interior and exterior land scap e calls ou r attention to the role that the m ore-thanhu m an w orld p lays in ou r lives. The very act of bringing attention to the m ore -than-hu m an has ethical im p lications. Lop ez, at the very least, calls for an aw areness that, as Slovic notes, creates a "con d ition w hich help s u s to act resp onsibly and resp ectfu lly" (138).
[2] Bu t Lop ez goes fu rther; by carefu lly balancing the interior and the exterior, he creates a necessary recip rocity betw een the tw o. In other w ord s, the interior land scap e, the land scap e of the m ind , is never ind ep end ent of the p hysical or the exterior land scap e. Likew ise, excep t as m ed iated by the interior land scap e of the m ind , hu m ans can never u nd erstand the exterior land scap e. The ou ter w orld shap es the m ind bu t the m ind also shap es the ou ter w orld .
Throu gh a "that cou ld hap p en" ap p roach and a rhetoric of assent, both Lop ez and Booth are attem p ting to find a p ragm atic theory of u nd erstand ing that inclu d es the p ersonal bu t d oes not aband on the em p irical and qu antitative. They both w ant to exp and w hat can be consid ered "tru e." For exam p le, Lop ez w rites: "Myth, w hich w e tend to regard as fictitiou s or 'm erely m etap horical,' is as authentic, as real, as the story of the w olverine in the m an's lap " (68). Even thou gh the creator of any narrative--fictional, factu al, or m ythic--w ill alw ays fall short of recreating reality becau se "p ercep tion and langu age both fail" (69) Lop ez him self clarifies these id eas in an interview w ith Step hen Trim ble. Becau se tru th is su ch a d ifficu lt thing at w hich to arrive, and becau se tru th and w riting are m u ch m ore com p lex than an attem p t at a d irect m im esis, the w riter's resp onsibility is not to a strict literal tru th, or even, says Lop ez, "to k now the tru th, becau se no one know s the tru th." Instead the w riter m u st "set the story u p in su ch a w ay that tru th can be revealed " (70). If the relationship s are carefu lly created , the read er can ask that next ethical qu estion: "Are these relationship s au thentic?" Or m ore accu rately: "H ow are these relationship s au thentic--to w hat d egree?" Moreover, if the story is au thentic, the relationship s w ill be carefu lly recreated and the story w ill not m islead its hearer or read er abou t the range of p ossibiliti es offered by the p lace.
The u sefu lness of the criteria of au thentic and inau thentic as a w ay of gau ging assent d ep end s u p on the qu estions w e are asking of literatu re. If these criteria are u sed as a w ay of evalu ating all literatu re, they need to be u sed carefu lly and self-consciou sly so that the critic d oes the literatu re ju stice and d oes not fall into the trap of the overly sim p listic that alw ays d ogs ethical criticism . Still, natu re w riting, the top ic w e are d iscu ssing here, is a sp ecial case that h as its ow n sp ecial set of assu m p tions.
Even thou gh, accord ing to Lop ez, fiction and m yth can be consid ered au thentic by the above criteria, w e are not focu sing on these genres. Ad m itted ly, bord ers betw een genres are p orou s, bu t there is a sp ecific contract set u p w ith the read er in nonfiction natu re w riting. There is an agreem ent betw een the read er and w riter; the w riter is attem p ting his or her best to com bine em p irical observation and literary art.
Writer David Qu am m en p u ts it this w ay: "I believe in hold ing nonfiction to a very rigorou s stand ard of factu al accu racy. [ . . . ] If it's an anim al d oing a given thing in a given p lace, it m eans that that anim al d id that thing in that p lace" (Su m ner, "Facts" 9). Bu ell agrees w ith Qu am m en and w rites that in natu re w riting there m u st be "a hu m an accou ntability to the environm ent" (7) . When asked by Red field , Dan Philip p on p u ts it this w ay: "The p rim ary [qu estion], it seem s to m e, [is] w hether the w riter of nonfiction has a contract w ith the read er not to p resent fictionalized or borrow ed m aterial as his or her ow n. That w riters of nonfiction u se the techniqu es of fiction w riters is a given, bu t w hether they shou ld u se fictional m aterial is another qu estion" (40). H ow ever, the fact that hearts w ere breaking at Key West illu strates how nonfiction creates certain exp ectations from th e read er, and the contract betw een the w riter and read er is broken w hen fictional m aterial is p assed off as fact.
H ow often d o w e find ou rselves saying, "Is this a 'tru e' story? Did this really hap p en?" Furtherm ore, w hen the read er find s that things are fabricated , he or she find s it m ore d ifficu lt to tru st the w riter. Yet, if w e are to p ractice a rhetoric of assent tow ard the relationship s natu re w riters are asking u s to assu m e w ith the w orld , w e need to tru st the w riter.
Desp ite the crafted d isp arity betw een literary p rod u ct and actu al event, I w ou ld argu e that Desert Solitaire qu alifies as au thentic. There is an integrity w ith w hich Abbey p ortrays the land scap e. Althou gh he self-consciou sly notes in his introd u ction that "langu age m akes a m ighty lo ose net w ith w hich to go fishing for sim p le facts," (xii) he carefu lly sorts ou t the relationship s betw een him self and the p lants, The great bird set its w ings and cam e sailing at great sp eed str aight tow ard the earth, p assing near the observer [Long] , w ho saw w ith w ond er that the head w ith p artly closed it is p ossible for the eagle to be sm itten w ith "ap op lexy in the air." Bu t if that w ere the case, Bu rrou ghs asks if it w ou ld "com e sailing calm ly to earth like a boy on a toboggan slid e" (307).
Bu rrou ghs's critiqu e w as scathing and to the p oint and , esp ecially at the tim e, his ethos as a natu ralist and w riter w as p ractically u nim p eachable. H e assu m ed that his article in the A tlantic M onthly w ou ld p u t an end to the "fakery" and that the d iscip line of natu re w riting had been ju stly d efend ed . Bu t in William Long, Bu rrou ghs fou nd a feisty and articu late op p onent w ho stu ck by his claim s and stru ck back w ith his p en. Instead of being cow ed by Bu rrou ghs, Long p u blished a carefu lly argu ed rebu ttal in the N orth A merican Review.
Long's rep ly d irectly ad d resses the m atter w ith w hich w e are concerned here --w hen to assent. I have argu ed that w e cannot fu nction if w e reserve ou r assent only for verifiable, em p irical fact, and that accord ing to both Booth and Lop ez there is a need for the p ersonal as w ell as the qu antifiable; bu t, esp ecially in the case w e are consid ering here--the case of natu re w riting--there is a lim it to how m u ch a story can stray from the em p irical d ep iction of the natu ral w orld and still be authentic. . ] rather than a w orld of description. It is a w orld that m u st be interp reted rather than catalogu ed ." H e continu es: "This u p p er w orld of ap p reciation and su ggestion, of ind ivid u ality interp reted by ind ivid u ality, is the w orld of N atu re, the N atu re of the p oets and p rop hets and thinkers" (688).
Long recognizes that there are d ifferent typ es of know led ge, w hich is an essential tenet in ou r argu m ent for assent. Fu rtherm ore, as noted earlier, w hat is accep table in natu re w riting, or in any literatu re, is not nearly as lim ited as w hat is accep table in a scientific rep ort. Even Bu rrou ghs agrees w ith this assertion. In his essay, "N atu re and the Poets," he w rites that the tru e p oet has m ore insight into natu re than the natu ralist becau se the p oet "carries [natu re's] op en secrets in his heart" (N atu re 93). [4] The stand ard s and exp ectations for science and literat u re are d ifferent. Bu rrou ghs seem s to be saying that literatu re allow s for--even requ ires--exp erim entation w ith p ercep tion and u nd erstand ing. In other w ord s, natu re w riting is not ju st a p resentation of em p irical d ata, bu t an interp retive p roject that at tem p ts to create recip rocity betw een the land scap e of the m ind and the land scap e of the w orld .
In his rebu ttal, Long argu es effectively for his literary view . H e asserts that for natu re w riting to be effective, the au thor "m u st not have only sight bu t vision; not sim p ly eyes and ears and a note-book; bu t insight, im agination, and above all, an intense hu m an sym p athy" --an argu m ent sim ilar to Lop ez's. Long's rebu ttal is astu te. The natu re w riter has m ore leew ay than the scientist; Bu rrou ghs m ay be relying too m u ch on the id ea of instinct to exp lain the behav ior of the anim als he observes, and ju st becau se he has not observed the p henom enon d oes not m ean that it d id not occu r.
As stu d ents of literatu re at the beginning of the tw enty -first centu ry rather than the beginning of the tw entieth, w e all recognize the im p ossibility of exact m im etic fid elity and are m ore aw are than ever that any rep resentation is p artial. Even w riters w ho are attem p ting accou ntability to the natu ral w orld The second story is one of several abou t "anim al su rgery" and is abou t a "w ood cock geniu s."
This tale com es from an observation Long recalled from tw enty years earlier w hen he w as in his m idteens. Long claim s he w atched the w ood cock from the op p osite sid e of a stream . Again I qu ote the short incid ent in fu ll:
At first he took soft clay in his bill from the ed ge of the w ater and seem ed to be sm earing it on one leg near the knee. Then he flu ttered aw ay on one foot for a short d istance and seem ed to be p u lling tiny roots and fibers of grass, w hich he w orked into the clay and p lastered it over the fibers, p u tting on m ore and m ore till I cou ld p lainly see the enlargem ent, w orking aw ay w ith strange silent intentness for fu lly fifteen m inu tes, w hile I w atched and w ond ered , scarce believing m y eyes. Then he stood p erfectly still for a fu ll hou r u nd er an overhanging sod , w here the eye cou ld w ith d ifficu lty find him , his only m otion m eanw hile being an occasional ru bbing and sm oothing of the clay band age w ith his bill, u ntil it hard ened enou gh to su it him , w h ereu p on he flu ttered aw ay from the So in ord er to evalu ate ou r assent, or to confid ently d issent, w e first m ay need to attain m ore know led ge abou t the natu ral w orld . The Cree w ho assented to the story of the w olverine d id so from a p lace of exp ertise. They had hu nted , trap p ed , and observed the w olverine ju st as had the N u nam iu t. So w e m u st also becom e aw are of ou r natu ral su rrou nd ings. W e m u st learn the d ifference betw een a p ond erosa and a p iñon p ine, w e m u st notice the blu e herons, the band ed kingfishers, or the Clark's N u tcrackers that enter ou r lives as w e go abou t ou r bu siness--w e m u st w atch the su btleties in the behavior of the oriole that is ou tsid e our kitchen w ind ow . [6] H ow ever, even w ith m y lim ited exp erience w ith bird s, I am not w illing to assent to Long. H is stories d o not fit m y sm all exp eriences w ith w ild anim als. I have d ifficu lty believing the story abou t the eagle coasting to his d eath, and Long has other equ ally hard to believe tales. One exam p le is of w olves snap p ing at the heart of a stag (Lu tts 111). I know enou gh abou t w olves to know that they are sm arter than that. They know that the best w ay to bring d ow n p rey is to bite w here the d eer is m ost vu lnerable.
A d eer's heart is p rotected by ribs and the w olves w ou ld be u nnecessarily risking their ow n lives to act so foolishly. Som e of Long's stories m ay be tru e; bu t in m y read ing, his m ore ou trageou s claim s u nd ercu t his ethos and p erm it m e to d ism iss the lot.
H ow ever, I think there are still m ore criteria w e can u se to d ecid e w hether or not to assent. We d o not w ant to fall into the sam e trap as Bu rrou ghs w hen he d em and s su ch a literal accou ntability to reality that he criticizes William Cu llen Bryant's p oetry, for exam p le, for its lack of ornithological accu racy. H ow can w e m ake a literary assent less abou t bickering over very sp ecific, d ifficu lt to verify facts, and m ore abou t w hat typ e of w orld these stories cre ate? That is, how can w e d eal w ith these stories in a w ay that is not too lim ited , bu t that in som e w ay still attem p ts to have an accou ntability to the m orethan-hu m an w orld ?
In exam ining this qu estion, I w ant to focu s on environm ental ethics. I am co nsciou s that I am bringing contem p orary ethical norm s to bear on Long's w ork, and therefore risking anachronism .
H ow ever, the contract Long establishes w ith his read ers is reliant u p on som e typ e of em p irical integrity and is, therefore, sim ilar to the con tract contem p orary natu re w riters establish.
The key to this p roblem seem s to be in Lop ez's em p hasis on relationship s. In "Land scap e and N arrative," Lop ez insists that it is the relationship s the storyteller establishes betw een the variou s elem ents of the exterior land scap e that d eterm ine w hether or not a story "rings tru e." (66). Law rence Bu ell talks abou t the issu e of rep resentation and Lop ez's theory. H e w rites: Lop ez's notion of "ou ter m im esis" in environm ental nonfiction seem ingly boils d ow n to this. Literatu re fu nctions as science's less system atic bu t m ore versatile com p lem ent.
Both seek to m ake u nd erstand able a p u zzling w orld . To a greater d egree than science, literatu re releases im agination's free p lay, thou gh the p lay is not entirely free, since the im agination is regu lated by encou nters w ith the environm ent both p ersonal and exp osed .
Thu s regu lated , the m ind is at leisu re to ram ble am ong intrigu ing hyp otheses, and it is not only p erm itted bu t exp ected to p resent theory as narrative or d escrip tive exp osition rather than as argu m ent (94).
The issu e, then, seem s to be not w hether literatu re allow s a p lace for the p lay of im agination, bu t to w hat d egree that im agination can roam and still be "regu lated by encou nters w ith the environm ent."
So the narratives that w e create abou t the natu ral w orld are theories abou t the w orld som ew hat analogou s to scientific theories. Bu t in narrative, the role of im agination is not ju st freer bu t also necessary for u nd erstand ing. Both the scientific and the na rrative attem p t to m ake sense of the w orld Kenneth Bu rke offers a term that is u sefu l for su ch a d iscu ssion. Any statem ent m u st be checked against w hat Bu rke calls the recalcitrance of reality. In other w ord s, ou r theories abou t reality eventu ally collid e w ith the object w orld , and the accu racy of ou r theories is alw ays eventu ally checked against su ch recalcitrance. Bu rke w rites: "'I can safely ju m p from this high p lace' m ay be a p seu d o -statem ent. 'I can safely ju m p from this high p lace w ith the aid of a p arachu te' m ight be the statem ent as revised after one had taken the recalcitrance of his m aterial ad equ ately into accou nt" (255-56). Bu rke ad vocates a continu al revision w ith the p otential not of getting it right, bu t of at least getting it better. Lop ez seem s to argu e that the recalcitrance of the ou ter land scap e p rovid es a corrective to ou r stories --both narrative and scientific. observes som e u nbelievable facts and brings them back to th e rational, intelligent Western w orld in ord er to be evalu ated . H e even claim s to have artifacts from the observation. "The nest hangs above m y table now ," Long w rites, "a rew ard of a tw enty-five years' search" (692). There is a d efinite hierarchy established betw een the observer and the observed . [7] Su ch a hierarchy d oes not exist in the story of the w olverine. Althou gh the w olverine is being hu nted by the m an on the snow m achine, there is a certain aw areness and recip rocity betw een the tw o.
The m an is in p u rsu it, bu t from the very m om ent he observes the w olverine, the w olverine is "p au sing to look back. The hu nter w as catching u p ," w rites Lop ez, "bu t each tim e he cam e over a rise the w olverine w as looking back from the next rise, ju st ou t of range" (62). The w olverine w as not m erely being observed by the hu nter; he w as also observing the hu nter. H e is looking back from each su cceed ing rise and finally ju m p s the m an. The hierarchy that exists in Long is not p resent in Lop ez's exam p le.
As the m an top s the next rise, the w olverine is bou nd ing tow ard him : "Bu t before he cou ld p u ll his rifle from its scabbard , the w olverine flew across the engine cow l and the w ind shield , hitting him squ are in the chest." The w olverine in Lop ez's tale is also anthro p om orp hized to som e d egree. After the snow m achine rolls over, he "fixes the m an w ith a stare" and then, w ithou t scratching or biting the m an, sim p ly w alks aw ay. The w olverine is given a certain hu m an -like consciou sness. We are led to believe that his stare had the sam e intent as w ou ld a stare from a m an after w inning a qu ick and d ecisive victory in a tavern braw l. This id ea is em p hasized even fu rther by the w olverine ru nning, bu t instead w alking aw ay from the beaten m an.
H ow ever, the sam e ad vantages of anthrop om orp hism occu r here w ithou t the p roblem s. There is a certain am ou nt of sym p athy created for the w olverine ju st as there is for the orioles and the w ood cock.
There is cred it given for intelligence and ability to su rvive. The line betw een the hu m an and the nonhu m an is breached here in u sefu l w ays and in som e sim ilar w ays to Long's accou nt. Bu t there is also a certain am ou nt of recip rocity established in the story of the w olverine, w hich is a resu lt of a lack of hierarchy. The w olverine is an equ al p articip ant in the w orld . Even thou gh he is being hu nted by the m an on the snow m achine--a m an w hose econom y d ep end s on the w olverine--it is in som e w ays an equ al m atch and , p artly becau se of his d ep end ence, the m an resp ects the w olverine w ho has w o n this rou nd .
We m u st also look at w hy the stories w ere related . In the case of the sw inging nest, it w as to p rove Long's reliability as a natu ralist. The w olverine story w as an attem p t by Lop ez to better u nd erstand the m ore-than-hu m an w orld . It is d ifficu lt to ignore these facts w hen w e gau ge ou r assent.
Yet, can there be inaccu rate stories w ith au thentic relationship s? Accu rate stories w ith inau thentic relationship s?
The reality is that w e are alw ays in d anger of being d u p ed . In the final analysi s, it is tru e that w e read natu re w riting not only for the facts them selves, bu t also for how those facts lead u s to see the w orld .
So the relationship criteria can be u sefu l in d eterm ining ou r assent to its ethical p osition. Althou gh it is p ossible to have inaccu rate stories w ith accu rate relationship s, su ch as in fiction, if the w riter claim s to be w riting nonfiction, the read er exp ects a certain fid elity to observation and real exp erience. Furtherm ore, if w e look to a p iece of w riting to tell u s abou t ou r relationship to the m ore-than-hu m an w orld , and the w riter show s little concern w ith the reality of that w orld , it is d ifficu lt to assent to her ethical claim s.
In short, becau se w e are being asked to take an ethical p osition tow ard the natu ral w orld , a w riter has an obligation to p ortray that w orld accu rately. H ow ever, w e alw ays risk assenting to an inaccu rate story and therefore an inaccu rate ethic. So finally, to gau ge ou r assent to the ethical p osition of a natu re w riter, w e m u st go ou t into the w orld ou rselves. We m u st gain som e exp erience w ith the w olverine, or even w ith the bird s in ou r ow n backyard . III I w ant to now retu rn to m y original thesis: a rhetoric of assent is necessary w hen read ing natu re w riters becau se natu re w riters are im aginatively exp loring how w e hu m ans can establish a m ore ethical relationship w ith the m ore-than-hu m an w orld , and any tim e w e are confronted w ith som ething that is so fu nd am entally op p osed to thou sand s of years of hu m an history, w e need to aband on an initial d ou bt for an initial belief w hich w ill help u s consid er the p ossibilities being p rop osed . Thu s, even if w e conclu d e that Long w as ind eed a "faker," w e m u st initially assent to his id eas in ord er to evalu ate them effectively.
Finally, I w ant to retu rn to the w ork of Lop ez. In his essay "Ap ologia" Lop ez recou nts a road trip from his hom e along the McKenzie river in Oregon to a friend 's hou se in Ind iana. On his jou rney, he takes note of the large nu m ber of d ead anim als along the road . H e sees black -tailed jackrabbits lying "like w elts of sod ," and a "cru m p led ad olescent p orcu p ine" w ith "blood flecked teeth" (83). H e encou nters d ead d eer, bad gers, snakes, raccoons and "p ronghorn antelop e sw ollen big as barrels by the sid e of the road , their legs sp layed rigid ly aloft" (86) . H e also brood s over the lives he takes as he d rives.
H e is trou bled by the you ng gu ll that he strikes and by the im m atu re barn sw allow that, d esp ite his w ild attem p t to avoid the collision, "hangs by its head , m otionless in the slats of the grill" (86). As he stop s for the night at a m otel he "finger -scrap es the d ry stiff carcasses of bu m blebees, w asp s, and bu tterflies from the grill and head light m ou ntings"--the "aerial p lankton." As he travels and brood s he stop s at each casu alty and carries or d rags it from the road , p lacing it gently in the grass or d ep ositing it carefu lly behind a bu sh, aw ay from the traffic. When asked by a m an, "Why d o you bother?" he resp ond s, "You never know . [ . . . ] The ones you give som e sem blance of b u rial, to w hom you offer an ap ology, m ay have been like seers in a p arallel cu ltu re. It is an act of resp ect, a techniqu e of aw areness" (84).
Lop ez is asking u s to consid er certain p ossibilities. H ow d oes ou r view of anim als change if w e see them as "seers in a p arallel cu ltu re?" More im p ortantly, Lop ez seem s to be attem p ting to red efine the trad itional relationship s w ith the m ore-than-hu m an. H e is asking u s to d evelop techniqu es of aw areness, to p erform acts of resp ect and enter into a recip rocal rela tionship , all of w hich seem to d ep end initially u p on assu m ing a rhetoric of assent. While read ing Lop ez, or other natu re w riters, w e m u st consid er how the w orld is p resented to u s and if it fits ou r life exp erience; if it d oes, w e m u st take a cu e from the Cree and say: "That cou ld hap p en." notes
